A Chat with Seth Frantzman: The Unfinished Wars: America, ISIS, Iran, Kurdistan and the Middle East

Washington Kurdish Institute

Giulia Valeria Anderson 10 March, 2020

On March 4, the Washington Kurdish Institute hosted a roundtable panel hosting Seth Frantzman, analyst and author of After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East. The panel focused on Syria, Iraq and the Kurds, featuring on-the-ground insights from Frantzman’s experiences and moderated by Sirwan Kajjo who works at the Extremism Watch Desk as Voice of America.

The US-Iran growing tensions post the physical defeat of ISIS, the recent killing of Qasem Soleimani

Frantzman, Author of “After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East” began his remarks by describing how he had first-hand experienced the height of the war on ISIS, as he spent several months in Mosul, Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas in Iraq throughout 2014 and 2016. Remembering how “they had taken Ramadi and they were very close to Baghdad, and they had this long front line that was stretching all the way from, in terms of the Kurdish region, from Kirkuk and all the way up, they still controlled areas of Sinjar.” He continued by stating that the war in Kobane had just ended and that the biggest doubt, and maybe fear, at the time focused on what was going to happen next, specifically “the degree of Iranian influence or the question of what would Iran’s role be” as its sphere of influence in the region had grown during the war on ISIS. Plus, he underlined how Iran was able to achieve two important steps in those years: a high-end influence in the Iraqi government apparatus and the legitimacy of a network of paramilitary and militia groups, of around 10.000 people, who were specifically part of the government security framework. This was an extremely important achievement because Iran had been able to reach something that, for example, Hezbollah had never been able to achieve.

Another important doubt that he felt was pressuring the Kurdish community, at the time, mostly concerned: “will the US stay? Will they continue to fund the Peshmerga training? Will they help to balance Iran?” One of his contacts told him that once the war on ISIS was over, there was going to be a war against the Iranians and conflict over Kirkuk – and, as much of the information, Frantzman reported on his book, these both, unfortunately, turned out to be true. Frantzman continues recalling one time when he went back to Iraq and covered the battle of Mosul, that to get there from the Kurdish region he had to cross the Nineveh plains, Christian villages and then you could finally arrive in eastern Mosul. Though, before getting to Mosul he remembers how he left the Kurdish flags behind, saw no Iraqi flag until he got to Mosul but in the middle, he only saw Hezbollah or the Popular Mobilization Forces known as “Hashd al-Shabi” ones hanging. He also stated how “it was immediately clear the way in which Iran, or pro-Iranian groups, were trying to grab hold of the real estate with their armed units, and armed units that have a political party as well. So, I think that when we think about the way in which Iran is trying to kind of influence the region, and sink itself into the soil a bit, it’s very important to understand the kind of long-term investment”. Because of this, and of many other problems, he remember how everybody he spoke to were extremely concerned on how this Iranian project would develop, “and also” he continues “I think there were several layers of concerns because in the Kurdish regions I think question was: if you have too many Iranian militias on the borders, the reaction is more ISIS. Like it’s a psycho, you know, if you crushed the dreams or the abilities of any of the Sunni’s to have some role, you eventually will have a reaction. So, I think even before the rise of ISIS, many people in the Kurdistan region had predicted that something was going to come out of there. And, in terms of Syria, which of course forms another side of this, I think from what I understand, there was not a lot of Iranian influence in Eastern Syria, but there is today of course”.

An important remark he underlines in his following speech is the fact that he believes Iran fears the Trump administrations’ willingness to kill people, especially if an American citizen is attacked. He states that Iran wants to remove US forces from Iraq and Syria, but that they want to do it peacefully as they are really concerned about Trump.

ISIS reemergence and the US withdrawal from Syria

Kajjo asked “Where do you see the situation? The Kurds are still trying to convince western intelligence officials that ISIS is still around. ISIS could probably resurge at some point. Where do you see the whole, not just the war on ISIS but also the Kurdish local dynamics and how will that play out into the broader picture of the region?”

To answer this question, analyzing the importance of the year 2015 is relevant. As 2015 was the year in which the SDF was founded, that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkey signed a ceasefire, and it was also the year in which ISIS got almost completely isolated from the Kurdish regions in Iraq. For this reason, Frantzman says that “if we go back to 2015, there is a high point of, in some ways of Kurdish power. You have the Kurdistan regional government is basically a state, because it’s so isolated from Baghdad. It has to behave basically like a country. So, it has its own armed forces, airports and of course eventually it will receive more and more funding and support from the coalition”. So, Kurdish power was growing in these years, there was much more growth inside the regions then what was though even if there was a downfold a couple of years after with the closure of the airports, though power was not completely at stake.

However, Frantzman also highlights how he believes that the Kurdish community must be careful in who they trust. Thus, he believes, is tied to the recent US partial withdrawal from Syria. He underlines how President Trump had previously announced, in Spring of 2017, that he was going to leave Syria – this did not happen until October 2019 – but, Frantzman stresses, how it should not have been a surprise. Frantzman highlighted how the United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Jim Jeffrey openly told Turkey that the US relation with the YPG and the SDF was temporary, transactional and tactical, and described them as: “Temporary is quite clear. Transactional means, if you take Raqqa, we give you guns. Okay, it’s done. So tactical. What does tactical mean? Obviously, it’s not a strategic relationship. it’s what the Americans called by-within-through, what it means is we work with you and by you and through you.” Frantzman though continues stating that “it is not a very nice thing if you’re the person on the other side of that deal, but I mean in a sense the Americans were saying this is a deal.” Consequently underlining how the Kurdish forces knew, or should have known is some sense, how the US was going to act notwithstanding the contradicting information coming from Centcom or the State Department – fundamentally because, as Frantzman emphasize, you need to listen who is on top, and that was President Trump.Stressing how the Kurdish region is flourishing and how “there’s a lot of sympathy again in Washington for the Kurdistan region of Iraq because everyone understands that the rest of Iraq is again falling into an Iranian occupied state. So, there is a discussion or maybe there should be more discussion, about the bilateral agreements with the Peshmerga for security assistance”.

US mission after October withdrawal

“But going back to Syria, don’t you think the mission has changed ever since the US withdrawal in October 2019? Brett McGurk, the former US presidential envoy to the coalition said that the mission started to defeat ISIS, but then it evolved to include curbing Iranian expansion in the region. Don’t you think that disappeared with the partial US withdrawal from parts of Syria?” asked Kajjo.

He begins his answer by saying that if the mission was to defeat ISIS, then Jim Jeffrey was right and that US-Kurdish relations were simply transactional and temporary. Plus, if this was the mission, and ISIS would, for example, be defeated then the US could use the region to block Iran – and begin a role of stabilization. However, Frantzman thinks that “the stabilization aspect is totally off the table, because the Trump administration’s view is laser-focused on what we are doing and why we are doing it? And if the generalists say: well, we’re there to stabilize, stabilization sounds like a waste of money. It sounds like Afghanistan. It sounds like a sunk cost. And if you’re Donald Trump and you think in terms of business, it’s a sunk cost. It’s a waste.” Though, if stabilization is considered to help Israel, block Iran, keep the detainees and control oil, then Frantzman believes that this is the reality of why the US would and should stay in the region. Fundamentally because if the US does leave, and this is the real mission, then every US soldier that leaves gives more space to Iran and, maybe, ISIS.

The future Kurdish-US partnership  

When the question arose about “What advice do you have for the Kurds moving forward in terms of managing, keeping this partnership with the US but also protecting their interest keeping in mind all these changes in the region?”

Frantzman said “There should be more honesty, especially on where the US will be going in the future – that is hard to understand given the country’s domestic crisis and creation of a new position within the modern world order. Historically, Frantzman underlines how in the 1990s the United States went into Iraq and then went into a whole bunch of other countries. There was Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, you just named the endless list. America was this global policeman and got involved in state-building. By the time you get to George W. Bush and the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a view that it’s not going to work. There’s not going to be a democratic spring. It’s not going to happen. We’re not good at state-building. Let’s just leave. And I think that the United States is in a long-term arc of trying to reduce forces. And so far, as it keeps forces it wants to confront the Russians and the Chinese.” He added “ counter-terrorism strategy, which was something that everyone loved in 2004-05-06 and all this. It seems like the general perception is it’s not our job in the United States to do counter-terrorism everywhere. We already are doing it in 80 countries. We already have almost 80,000 members of the so-called special forces basically doing this.”

Frantzman believes that as the US needs to be honest, the Kurds as well. Plus, he underlines how the Kurds are that one community the US and most of the international community cares about, especially because the US has never cared as much for any other community in the world (for example the Rohingya are not a community extremely close to the US notwithstanding they critical situation in Myanmar). Frantzman believes the US should be seen for what it is, and so the Kurds should remember Jim Jeffrey’s words when they entertain relations with the US. To understand this, Frantzman believes the Kurds should keep in mind an important quote of former President Ronald Reagan: ”trust but verify”. Because Frantzman believes that “if the Kurds trust the Americans, they should verify that as well”. It is for this reason, that Frantzman believes the Kurds should begin contracting relations with other countries as well, for example, Hungary (that already has a small relation with them), other Eastern European countries, Azerbaijan, other countries in southwest Asia, or also simply Russia and China. Frantzman believes that the Kurds should not only stick with the US just because they are the United States but that they should push on small countries as well that have no ties with them, especially because the Kurdish regions are not a colony of the US.

Israel and the Kurds 

“Do you think Israel should be more interested in developing forging new alliances with different Kurdish groups?” asked Kajjo after several reports suggesting a relationship in the recent years between the Kurds and Israel in both Iraq and Syria. He replied “I think the question with Israel is not always whether or not Israel would like the relationship, it’s whether the Kurds would like to have an open relationship because of course it causes them political trouble. Like if someone in the Kurdistan Region, an official for instance, would meet an Israeli official, then there will be, of course, some huge gossip in Baghdad and some newspaper reports. I think that actually it’s the Kurdistan region that has to hedge a bit sometimes about that. It doesn’t always help to openly hang out with the Israelis. Maybe it helps to hang out with the Israelis in a form in which other countries in the region are doing that”. This last statement, as Frantzman stressed, is because many other countries have been creating relations with Israel. Turkey at first, Jordan, and many others, and he believes there are rumors that relations with the Gulf States are getting better. Consequently, if other countries are openly having relations with Israel, the Kurds should consider doing the same. Plus, Frantzman asserting how Israel was the only country that openly gave humanitarian aid to the Kurds in October 2019, and that most recently have announced aid due to the Covid-19 cases on the territory.

“But in the Syrian context, do you think Israel should be more interested in certain Kurds, as it borders with Syria, as opposed to Kurds in general?” asked Kajjo. Frantzman concluded about  the fact that Israel is interested in Americans staying in Syria “and so far, that’s a shared interest with the Kurds, and sincerely, it’s a shared interest. There’s a shared interest in having American power, American influence, America’s role” he added “the idea that having too much Iranian power in Eastern Syria is not helpful, certainly for Israel’s interests, of the US or others.”