As US-North Korea talks fail, what happens with Iran? – Analysis

JANUARY 1, 2020 23:09

From the start, Israeli officials viewed the US treatment of North Korea and Iran as possibly linked, and not necessarily in a good way.

Now that the North’s leader, Kim Jong Un, is threatening to return to full and even more advanced nuclear weapons testing, it appears that the US-North Korea negotiations track has fallen apart completely. Where does this leave Israel’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program?

The truth is that a failed North Korean track where President Donald Trump sticks to his guns, while maybe a bad result for the US, might be positive for Israel regarding Tehran.

Understanding this requires a quick look back at three stages of the Iran and North Korea tracks with the Trump administration.

At early stages of his presidency, Israeli officials were happy with Trump’s tough talk against North Korea, but were worried that he might get distracted from dealing with Iran.

They were alternately buoyed by Trump’s “fire and fury” talk against Pyongyang, hoping he would take an equally tough stance with Iran, but concerned that until May 2018, when Trump withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, he did not seem ready to pressure Iran.

Everything changed between May and July 2018.

In May 2018, Trump went for the jugular with Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal and launching his maximum pressure campaign, which has hobbled the Islamic Republic’s economy.

In contrast, in July 2018 Trump held a summit with Kim. Trump was seemingly ready to offer sanctions relief and a withdrawal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula and area in exchange for significant, but not necessarily full, denuclearization.

Israelis got worried that if Trump cut a deal with Pyongyang short of full denuclearization, this would empower Tehran to ask for a similar deal – which might not look that different from the 2015 deal.

Stage three came in May 2019, when Trump ended sanctions waivers for eight countries to do business with Iran, countries that were key to its economy, including China.

In stage three with Kim, negotiations started to break down in late 2018 and early 2019, but were kept from falling apart, with successive summits or meeting-ups between Trump and the North Korean leader.

Israeli officials were thrilled with the maximum pressure campaign against Iran going into overdrive. But they worried that Trump, until this week, seemed shy about pushing back when Tehran used military force.

Jerusalem was also worried around the September UN General Assembly that with the North Korea track going downhill, Trump might try to grab a summit with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, so that he could have one negotiation that was giving off positive vibes.

In the end, Trump has not cut a soft deal with Pyongyang. He probably would have cut a deal short of full denuclearization if Kim had been more flexible.

It probably would have included a full documentation of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, taking apart its nuclear facilities and observation of any nuclear weapons it might be permitted to keep in storage.

Alternatively, there might have been partial sanctions relief for partial denuclearization. But North Korea was interested only in full sanctions relief for taking apart some of its nuclear facilities and without giving a full declaration of its nuclear arsenal.

Either of these deals would have worried Israel that Iran would seek the same deal.

Many US officials and North Korea experts expect Kim to carry out a new major nuclear test. It could even be a more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile test (translate: a weapon that could hit the US) than previous tests, to raise the pressure against Trump.

At the same time, these same officials are scratching their heads to understand why North Korea threatened a “Christmas present” – interpreted as a major nuclear test, since that was what the phrase meant during a test a few years ago – but still has not taken major action.

This may be a tactical delay, and the new test may be coming – or North Korea may be talking tough but still hoping to cut a deal.

Israel would regard an end to the North Korean talks and heightened nuclear tensions as bad for the world in a general way. However, in the narrow Middle East and Iran-focused calculus, it confirms the idea of holding the line in all nuclear negotiations.

In contrast, any nuclear deal with Kim that falls short of the tougher deal Israel wants secured with the Islamic Republic would still be viewed by Israel with suspicion that it will compromise the tough line with Iran.

Of course, the concerns that Trump may flip back into trying to cut a deal with Iran to replace the failed North Korean track are unlikely to go away. Yet the current, increased US-Iran tensions in Iraq make that highly unlikely.

The last thing that both tracks have in common is that both Iran and North Korea may simply wait at this point to decide their next real moves until 10 months from now, when it is clear who the next US president will be.

In the meantime, Israel is content with a frozen North Korean track, as long as Trump does not turn soft on Tehran.