Iran Nuclear Capable Cruise Missiles Hoveizeh and Soumar 2019.pdf

IRAN’S NUCLEAR CAPABLE CRUISE MISSILES Tehran’s Reversed Engineering of a Soviet Nuclear Cruise Missile, the Hoveizeh & Soumar CMs By Stephen E Hughes ASSOCIATION OF GEO-STRATEGIC ANALYSIS February 20, 2019 0 This Association of Geo-Strategic Analysis report addresses the following critical issues, The how and when the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) obtained several Soviet-era nuclear- capable cruise missiles, the Kh-55 A closer look at Iran’s Nuclear Capable Cruise Missiles, Hoveizeh & Soumar Could the IRI miniaturize a nuclear warhead ? and the deadly cruise missile threat. February 20, 2019 1 WHERE WOULD IRAN OBTAIN A NUCLEAR FIRE-STORM? Ukraine, March 31st, 2005 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko confirmed that nuclear-capable cruise missiles were illegally sold to Iran and China. The Soviet Nuclear Cruise Missile Kh-55 Granat also known as AS-15 Kent or X-55. 2005 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko says the country’s former regime secretly and illegally sold nuclear-capable cruise missiles to Iran and China. In March 2005, in an interview with USA’s NBC News, Yushchenko offered the highest-level acknowledgement that the sales of Kh-55 nuclear capable cruise missiles, had indeed taken place, this confirmation shook the US and International intelligence communities. Yushchenko said the Kh-55 missiles were exported under a forged contract that had Russia as the country of destination. A copy of the contract obtained by the TV network NBC appears to bear clearance stamps for the export of 20 missiles to Russia. In the interview with US television, Yushchenko confirmed Ukrainian officials’ earlier reports of the sale. In his words, “I confirm this, though I do so with bitterness.” “I confirm this, though I do so with bitterness,” President Viktor Yushchenko said. ➢ Omelchenko Letter Anti-corruption lawmaker Omelchenko was a ranking State Secret Services (SBU) officer and a deputy belonging to Yulia Tymoshenko’s parliament faction. Omelchenko was the past head of the parliament’s committee on combating organized crime and corruption. On 28 January 2005, Ukrainian parliamentarian Hryhoriy Omelchenko issued an open letter to President Viktor Yushchenko informing him Ukraine had illegally sold Kh-55 cruise missiles to Tehran and Beijing. It’s was a credible report, which names dates, names, the bank accounts, fictitious shell companies that were set up to extradite the transfer of money from Tehran. Plus, there was corroborating evidence of this whole affair. He referred to a paper company set up in Cyprus to channel money for the missiles. Six of the Kh–55 nuclear cruise missiles purportedly ended up in the IRI. Another six allegedly went to China. However, export documents known as ‘end-user certificates’ recorded the final recipient of some 20 Kh-55 missiles for sale known as “Russia’s Defense Ministry,” according to Omelchenko’s letter. There was no mention as to what resulted with the eight remaining missiles. In 2005 Oleksandr Sushko was the director of the Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy, a Ukrainian Kyev-based think tank. He stated it is difficult to believe that Ukraine sold cruise missiles to Iran and managed to hide such a deal for several years. February 20, 2019 2 “The missiles allegedly sold to Iran were unarmed, but are April 2005: A Washington Times report designed to carry 200-kiloton nuclear warheads. ’’……. revealed that Iran paid $49.5 million for the six Omelchenko’s letter Kh-55 missiles it received in an air shipment from Ukraine between May and June 2001. The 575 Nuclear Cruise Missiles Are Missing Ukrainian Defense shipments had been misleadingly identified as Minister Yevhen Marchuk finally admitted, that several hundred of oil-pipeline material. Source: Bill Gertz, his country’s missiles were ‘unaccounted’ …including “ 575 Kh-55 “Missiles Sold to China and Iran,” Washington Times, April 6th, 2005. and X-55M which were supposed to have been decommissioned in the years that followed the break-up of the USSR.” Ukrainian weapons dealers ferried missiles to China through a Ukraine-based cargo company run by a former secret service agent, Omelchenko also said in 2001 that weapons dealers sent ground targeting systems, maintenance equipment and missile technicians to Iran. Profits from the sales were estimated at $2.1 million or more, the letter said. Also, according to Omelchenko’s letter, in 2000, Russian national Oleg Orlov and a Ukrainian partner identified as E.V. Shilenko “exported 20 Kh-55 cruise missiles through a false contract and ‘end-user certificate’” with Russia’s state-run arms dealer and with a firm called Progress, which is a subsidiary company of Ukrspetseksport – Ukraine’s weapons exporting agency. S.H. Heritage Holding Limited Haider Sarfraz was an Australian citizen of Afghan-Iranian origin, general director and owned S.H. Heritage. He became one of the world’s leading arms dealers who is said to have brokered deals worth more than $10 billion. His code name was “Dex”.Iran also received a KNO-120 ground support system; according to Omelchenko letter, Satak Co. Ltd and S. H. Heritage Holding Limited of Cyprus allegedly used a fictitious $49.5 million contract for oil industry equipment to conceal the payments for the transfer to Tehran; according to Omelchenko letter, in 2002 Satak Co. Ltd transferred $12 million to S. H. Heritage Holding Ltd., which also received $1.5 million soon thereafter from Iran’s Defense Ministry; according to Omelchenko, S.H. Heritage Holding thereafter transferred $7 million to the U.S. firm SP-Trade Inc., which sent $2.25 million into the account of the U.S. firm Interworks LLC, which then transferred $750,000 to an account in Odessa (withdrawn). Sarfraz died in 2004 under suspicious circumstances. It is believed Iranian agents assassinated him because later he claimed Kh-55 cruise missiles had nuclear warheads. An autopsy revealed that his neck had been broken and his aorta split. Also, according to Omelchenko’s letter, in 2000, Russian national Oleg Orlov and a Ukrainian partner identified as E.V. Shilenko “exported 20 Kh-55 cruise missiles through a false contract and ‘end-user certificate’” with Russia’s state-run arms dealer and with a firm called Progress, which is a subsidiary company of Ukrspetseksport – Ukraine’s weapons exporting agency3. Shilenko remains at large, said Omelchenko’s letter, which also notes an attempt on Orlov’s life, saying: “The physical elimination of Orlov in a Czech prison was prevented.” The State Security Service also issued an official inquiry about a Cyprus- based Russian man identified in the letters as G. K. Shkinov, who also remains at liberty. Valery Malev, the head of Ukrspetseksport, has also been implicated in the deals. But he died in 2002 in Ukraine when his car collided with a truck. Police concluded he had fallen asleep at the wheel. However, many speculate that his car had been tampered with. “Valery Malev, the head of Ukrspetseksport, knew that missiles were not exported to Russia but to third world countries and with forged documents,” Omelchenko wrote. February 20, 2019 3 Footnotes / Sources (The Omelchenko Letter Section is from the Book, Tehran’s Wars of Terror and its Nuclear Delivery Capability, publish 2007 Trafford) “August 24th, 1991, Ukraine: When it became an independent state on August 24th, 1991, Ukraine possessed a large nuclear weapons arsenal that represented as much as 15 percent of the Soviet total. Next to the Russian Federation, it also possessed the largest civilian nuclear power program in the former Soviet Union, ranking in the top ten worldwide in terms of operational reactors and total capacity. In addition, it claimed a well-developed nuclear research infrastructure, uranium mines, chemical plants for processing uranium ore, tens of kilograms of HEU in bulk form, heavy water production capabilities, and several nuclear-related dual-use commodities such as zirconium, hafnium, and ion-exchange resins. Ukraine also inherited a large military industrial base equipped to manufacture ballistic missiles. Indeed, the Pivdenmash (Yuzhmash) Production Association was the largest missile factory in the world. Ukraine also manufactured solid rocket engines at the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant and produced ICBM control and guidance systems at the Khartron Scientific Production Association in Kharkiv. Moreover, Ukraine’s military industrial base, extended well beyond that of the nuclear and missile sectors. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was estimated to have had approximately 15 percent of the former Soviet defense plants and military research and development facilities.” The Defense Industries of The Newly Independent States of Eurasia, CIA Directorate of Intelligence (January 1993), P. 7. {Updated 11/6/2001} Nti.Org/E_Research/Profiles/Ukraine/Index_4926.Html#Overview February 20, 2019 4 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the “most powerful military force in Europe” four combined-arms armies and one tank army, four air fleets, one army corps and three air defense corps, the 43rd Missile Army, heavy long-range bomber aviation capabilities and other units. The military arsenal consisted of about 9,000 tanks, 11,000 armored vehicles, 18,000 artillery systems, and up to 3,900 warplanes and helicopters. Foreign military experts estimated the value of the Soviet military legacy to be US$89 billion. Ukraine was in a relatively unique position in that as a front-line (first echelon) Soviet republic it possessed and inherited the best quality and large volumes of military equipment. Much of this was superfluous to Ukraine’s security needs after 1992, and so it is not surprising that much of it found its way abroad, often illicitly. Ukraine’s International Black-market Arms Sales A Ukrainian parliamentary commission revealed Ukraine’s 1992 military stocks were worth $89 billion, however, in the course of the next six years, some $32 billion of that was stolen, with much of it re-sold abroad. The investigation was headed by a parliamentary deputy and the former deputy defense minister, Lieutenant General Oleksandr Ihnatenko, who was court-martialed and stripped of his rank. Ihnatenko leaked some of his findings to Serhiy Odarych, who headed the Kyiv think tank Ukrainian Perspectives. Odarych was accosted and shot in the leg in July 1998 and says he was warned to stop publicizing those findings. Hence, Tehran, China, North Korea could have purchased much, much more of Soviet era deadly military warfare equipment through this black arms market. Uncovered $ 32 Billion In Past Illegal Arms Sales, December 16th, 2005, during testimony before the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) Serhiy Sinchenko, the head of the parliamentary commission investigating cases of illegal arms and munitions sales to other countries, declared that between 1992 and 1997, US$32 billion worth of military equipment and munitions that Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union was stolen and illegally sold abroad. According to Sinchenko, the main reason for such uncontrolled criminal activity was the absence, at the time, of relevant export control legislation regulating arms transfers. This was for the most part arranged through Official Ukrainian Ministry departments, by fraudulent means. This came to light, following an investigation, which revealed that the Iran – China Kh- 55 missile deal was based on a fabricated contract with the Russian state-owned Rosvooruzhenie Corporation. The Islamic Republic of Iran, cruise missiles are not mentioned in any United Nations resolutions that ban work on ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. February 20, 2019 5 The Kh- 55:is an air-launched platform developed by the Soviet Union starting in 1971. Originally designed as a strategic system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead 2,500 km, the missile has given rise to several variants. These include the Kh-55SM, an extended range version; the Kh-555, a conventional version; and the Kh-65SE, a conventional version designed for export. Kh-55 At a Glance Originated From: Russia Possessed By: Russia Alternate Name: AS-15 ‘Kent”, RKV-500, X-65C3, Kh-SD Class: Subsonic cruise missile: Subsonic cruise missile flies at a speed lesser than that of sound. It travels at a speed of around 0.8 Mach Basing: Air-launched- Soviet/Russian long-range strategic cruise missile carried by T-95M Bear and Tu- 160 Blackjack strategic bombers. Length: 6.04 m Diameter: .514 m Launch Weight: 1,210 kg Payload: Single warhead, 410 kg Warhead: Nuclear, 200-250 kiloton Propulsion: Turbofan Range: 2,500 km Status: Operational In Service: 1984 https://sketchfab.com/tags/strategic 3D MODEL The Kh-55 a point of fact it was actually patterned after a US BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile, it is similar to the Tomahawk in many respects. Sometimes it is even nicknamed the ‘Tomahaw-ski’. However, the Tomahawk is an intermediate range, subsonic cruise missile that is launched from US Navy ships and submarines. It provides a long-range, deep strike capability. The Tomahawk can carry either conventional or nuclear payloads. The Kh-55 it is an air-delivered missile, rather than the Tomahawk’s surface/sub- launched weapon. The Kh-55 cruise missile is used as a long-range standoff weapon. It is carried and launched by bomber aircraft. The Kh-55 and its versions are carried by a Tu-160 long-range strategic bomber (12 missiles), Tu-95 strategic bomber (6 or 16 missiles, depending on the version), and even Su-34 interdictor (1 missile). The Kh-55 was also tested on a Tu-22M medium-range bomber, however it is not normally carried by this aircraft. February 20, 2019 6 The Kh-55 has a drop-down turbojet engine. During flight the engine A cruise missile is an unmanned drops below the missile. Also, there are pop-out wings for cruising self-propelled (till the time of efficiency. The Kh-55 can be launched at altitudes ranging from 20 impact) guided vehicle that sustains flight through meters out to 10 000-12 000 meters. This missile has inertial guidance aerodynamic lift for most of its system with Doppler radar/terrain map updates. It uses radar and flight path and whose primary images stored in the memory of and onboard computer to find its mission is to place an ordnance or target. The original Kh-55 might not be particularly accurate however its special payload on a target. They nuclear warhead compensates for accuracy. fly within the earth’s atmosphere and use jet engine technology. These vehicles vary greatly in The Kh-55 has multiple variants these versions also closely resemble the their speed and ability to designs of early versions of the Tomahawk. The air-launched cruise penetrate defenses. Cruise missile has a max range of 3500 km and uses inertial navigation as well missiles can be categorized by as Terrain Contour Matching. It can travel at Mach .77 at a cruise size, speed (subsonic or altitude of 40 to 110 meters. Despite coming into service in 1984 as a supersonic), range and whether launched from land, air, surface counter to the US BGM-109 Tomahawk, the Kh-55 is still used to this ship or submarine. day. Most recently, one of its variants, the Kh-555, was used to strike ground targets in Syria in 2015 using Tu-22M strategic bombers. Russian Kh-65SE and Kh-SD Cruise Missiles, Russian exported versions of the Kh-55 The Kh-65SE & Kh-SD is a conventional version based on the Kh-55 designed for export. They can carry a 410 kg HE (High -explosive) warhead 600 km. Three years later, in 1995, a similar missile called the D was reported. This missile would have fallen within the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime due to its reduced range of 300 km. Although, in 1999 the range was reportedly increased to 600 km. Its exact status is unknown. China China’s cruise missile capability took a giant leap forward after its receipt of the Kh-55s. CJ-10 is a Chinese land attack cruise missile,(LACM) which is based on the Kh-55 technology. Jane’s reported the CJ-10 was test fired in 2004. An August 2012 report by Jane’s indicated that a shipborne version of the missile had been tested on Bi Sheng, a Chinese weapons trial ship. Since 2005 PRC array of cruise missiles have grown in leaps and bounds. Video China cruise missile Long Sword -10 CJ-10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCsvWZwKupY The DH-10 Cruise missile is another example . A DH-10 land attack cruise missile (LACM) launches out of its canister The Type 052D guided missile destroyer and Type 093A nuclear attack submarines can carry DH-10s in their vertical launch systems; sea-launched DH-10s can cover over 90 percent of all global land mass. These two examples can carry a nuclear warhead 20- 90 Kiloton range. “The People’s Republic of China is in the process of building and deploying a sophisticated and modern missile arsenal, though one shrouded in secrecy due to intentional ambiguity and unwillingness to enter arms control or other transparency agreements. Beijing features its missiles most prominently in its developing anti-access/area denial doctrines, which use a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air, land and sea to target U.S. and U.S. allied military assets in the Asia-Pacific theater. China is also developing several February 20, 2019 7 advanced capabilities such as maneuverable anti-ship ballistic missiles, MIRVs, and hypersonic glide vehicles” Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of China,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, published June 14, 2018, last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/. How IRI’s Nuclear Cruise Missile Research & Develop Flourishes Tehran has over two decades hidden its nuclear procurement networks behind a web of front companies, banks, and international middlemen, global criminal enterprises. These transnational proliferation arteries stretch across the vast international community. Additionally, Beijing has resisted efforts to disclose the activities of Chinese traders that move the vast majority of illicit nuclear, military, missile technology, etc. to the Islamic Republic. ❖ More than likely Beijing and Tehran worked closely on reverse engineering the Kh-55 ❖ There were hundreds of Kh-55 missing from Ukraine, and others sold ❖ Russian export versions of the Kh-55 THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN NUCLEAR CRUISE MISSILES, THE HOVEIZEH & SOUMAR Soumar Soumar at a Glance Basing: Ground-launched Land Attack Cruise Missiles “Iran has the largest missile force in the Middle (LACM) or Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) East, consisting of thousands of short- and Length: 7.24 m medium-range ballistic missiles, and land-attack Diameter: 0.514 m cruise missiles. Although its missiles are conventionally armed, many could deliver a nuclear Warhead: Conventional, possibly nuclear capable weapon if Iran were to ever acquire such a Propulsion: Two-stage solid propellant capability. While the nuclear accord with Iran—the Range: 2,000-3,000 km Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Status: Presumed Operational was given international legal force by UN Security In service: 2012-present Council Resolution 2231— will likely defer such an eventuality, it did not impose new constraints on International analysts contend the Soumar is a copy of the Iran’s missile program. On the contrary, UNSCR 2231 loosened them—and included provisions for Russian Kh-55. However, a significant difference in the their lifting in eight years, if not sooner” two, the Soumar is equipped with a solid rocket booster and is thus a LACM, rather than the air-launched Kh-55. Testing the Limits: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program, Sanctions, and the IRGC Michael Eisenstadt Kahn According to Iranian news source Press TV, the Soumar Fellow and Director, Military and Security Studies possess “pinpoint accuracy” compared to previous cruise Program, The Washington Institute for Near East missile developments and can, “hit within 50 meters of its Policy Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee March 29, 2017 pre-designated target https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Do cuments/testimony/EisenstadtTestimony2017032 9.pdf February 20, 2019 8 Soumar’s range. Initially, the IRI claimed its new cruise missile had a range of 3,000 km (later claims, 1500km). However, to reach that distance, the Soumar would need conformal fuel tanks, which it did not have when unveiled in March 2015. So, the is estimated would drop the range to 2,500 km (same as the Kh-55). There is still skepticism over this updated range. The Russian Kh-55 uses a turbofan engine. Tehran has claimed to be developing a turbojet engine called the Tolou-4, similar to the French Microturbo TRI 60-2 engine. Technically a high enough thrust on a turbojet engine, accompanied with more fuel, smaller warheads, and a more aerodynamic surface (all of which the Soumar does not have), would allow it to equal the strength of a turbofan. As such, it may be reasonable to assess that the Soumar’s range is less than 2,500 km. Six Soumar missiles revealed in 2015 were equipped with an engine with very close resemblance to the Ukrainian R95. This might suggest the Islamic Republic acquired turbofan engines separately from the missiles. Unlike the Kh-55, the Soumar’s engine does not fold out from the missile’s body, but installed externally on it. Western intelligence officials, who studied footage of the Soumar in 2015 issued by Iranian television, have noticed the missile to be a little longer than 6 meters, with the original diameter of 20.2”. Its full weight is 1,210 kg or 1,530 kg with the booster rocket. The warhead emerges to weigh 150-170 kg. Its maximum cruise speed estimated Mach 0.7, and the radar-cross section appears more significant than the Tomahawk’s. There appears to be no sensor installed in the missile’s nose, which means a GPS/INS navigation system guides it. Therefore, its accuracy estimated at 50 meters. “sonar is equipped with a Doppler-pulse radar, which correlates measurements to a pre-programmed map, enabling it to follow the terrain at an altitude of 300 ft. in the last stages of flight,” an intelligence official stated in 2015. C-SPAN Uzi Rubin analysis and opinion on Iran Long-Range “Soumar” Land attack cruise missile. Uzi Rubin was a Director for the Missile Defense Organization of Israel. Video – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRqpA3eV2LE Defenseupdate Published on Mar 9, 2015Iran test-fires SOUMAR Land Attack Cruise Missile Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4njkTk_OBSI The Iranian-backed rebel group Ansar Allah (Houthis) released a video on 3 December 2017 showing what appeared to be a Soumar missile being launched in what it claimed was an attack on the Barakah nuclear power plant being built in Abu Dhabi Saudi Arabi. February 20, 2019 9 February 20, 2019 10 ➢ HOVEIZEH Iran unveils new missile on 40th anniversary of revolution euro news (in English) Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELiD4tM2E4E The Hoveizeh long-range ground-launched cruise missile was unveiled during the Eghtedar 40 defense exhibition in Tehran on 2 February 2019. The display model had a larger engine than the Soumar missile unveiled in 2015. IRI Defense Minister Amir Hatami said during the ceremony that the Hoveizeh is a development of the Soumar cruise missile unveiled in March 2015. “The missile has a range of over 1,350 km, can fly at a low altitude, has high precision and accuracy, and is capable of heavily destroying ground targets,” Hatami said. The Hoveizeh is a LACM launched by attaching a solid-fuel booster and using an air-breathing cruise engine is fixed rather than one that drops down after launch as in the Soviet Kh-55. The air-breathing engine seen on the Hoveizeh model displayed at the exhibition was also noticeably more extended than the one fitted to the Soumar. Hatami added the Hoveizeh successfully tested fired on a 1,200 km-long range, with the defense ministry releasing footage showing a cruise missile being launched. Amirali Hajizadeh, head of the Revolutionary Guard aerospace division, said Iran had overcome initial problems in producing jet engines for cruise missiles and could now manufacture a full range of the weapons. The Defense Ministry’s website carried an undated video purportedly showing the Hoveizeh being test-fired from a mobile launcher. It quoted Hatami as saying the missile had successfully hit targets at a distance of 1,200 km. Soumar and Hoveizeh are produced by Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), an entity subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Both MODAFL and AIO are sanctioned by the US and the EU. So the sanctions work ? February 20, 2019 11 • Neither Israel nor US has the capacity to counter Iran’s new cruise missile, no military force in the world has so far found an effective means of intercepting cruise missiles before they strike, unless they are of short range. DEBKAfile ➢ BUT DOES THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAVE ANY CAPABILITY TO MINIATURIZE ➢ NUCLEAR WARHEADS? The most critical aspect of Tehran’s capability of not only producing nuclear weapons but miniaturizing nuclear warheads to fit into a variety of the IRI inventory of missiles is Soviet’s Nuclear Weapons Expert Professor Danilenko Vyacheslav. Yet, strangely we hear little about of him. Professor Danilenko Vyacheslav International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 2011 Iran Safeguards Report: Iran’s Work and Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon. Most of that evidence surrounds one Professor Vyacheslav Danilenko, a high explosives expert from the Cold War era. The IAEA solidly confirmed that he was in Iran from 1996-2002 and returned to Russia. The IAEA verified through three separate sources, including the expert himself that he was in Islamic Republic during that February 20, 2019 12 time. Reuters reported that from the 1950s until his retirement, Danilenko worked at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), which is a top secret Soviet nuclear weapons complex research center in the Ural Mountains. Yet it is strange he persists in claiming “I am not a nuclear physicist”. Russia is considered the world’s leader in the development of experimental explosive devices and techniques for the study of shock waves. It was not until the early 1990s that the actual details of these devices were first described in the open scientific literature. Professor Danilenko worked with many of the greats of Russian nuclear weapons science including Zababakhan, Krupnikov & Kuzl. Krupnikov, who helped develop the electrical contact shock wave diagnostics for the first Russian nuclear weapon, According to Professor Danilenko he worked in the Islamic Republic for “ostensibly to assist Tehran in the development of a facility and techniques for making ultradispersed diamonds (UDD), where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications.” To note, nanodiamond process is strikingly similar to the process that leads to the miniaturization of nuclear weapons detonators. He told the IAEA that he lectured and constructed an explosive firing cylinder which was not designed for experiments on spherical systems. February 20, 2019 13 Professor Danilenko worked with leading Cold War era explosives experts in the Soviet nuclear weapons program and developed understanding of the fundamentals of detonation, including shock compression. He also has experience in the important area of the diagnostics of high explosions. His publications include work on high-speed photography and describe optical techniques by which fiber optic cables are used to capture the time of arrival of explosive shock waves. Danilenko was hired by Dr. Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi, then leader of Iran’s Physics Research Center, responsible for its nuclear weaponization program demonstrates just how relevant Danilenko’s expertise was to Iran’s weaponization efforts. R265 Shock Generator System: “The IAEA also obtained from member states details of the design, development, and possible testing of what is called in IAEA information the R265 shock generator system, which is a round multipoint initiation system that would fit inside the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile tri-conic nose cone. This device involves a hemispherical aluminum shell with an inside radius of 265 mm and wall thickness of 10 mm thick. Outer channels are cut into the outer surface of the shell, each channel one by one millimeter, and contain explosive material. Each channel terminates in a cylindrical hole, 5 mm in diameter, that is drilled though the shell and contains an explosive pellet. The geometrical pattern formed by channels and holes is arranged in quadrants on the outer February 20, 2019 14 hemispheric surface which allows a single central point Strategy and Doctrine During the Cold War, the of initiation and the simultaneous detonation of Soviet Union – considered nuclear weapons to explosives in all the holes on the hemisphere. This in turn be instrumental to its military strategy. Although the Soviet Union had pledged that it allows the simultaneous initiation of all the high would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, explosives under the shell by one exploding bridgewire most Western observers doubted that it would (EBW). If properly prepared, the R265 constitutes the observe this pledge in a conflict. Instead, outer part of an explosively driven implosion system for analysts argue that the Soviet Union had integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting a nuclear device. The outer radius of the R265 system is plans to a much greater degree than the United 275 millimeters, or a diameter of 550 millimeters, less States. Soviet analysts stressed that these than the estimated diameter of about 600 millimeters weapons would be useful for both surprise available inside the payload chamber of a Shahab 3 (or attack and preemptive attack. According to one the Sejjil-2 missile).” Institute for Science and Russian analyst, the Soviet Union would have used nonstrategic nuclear weapons to conduct International Security Washington D.C. [ strategic operations in the theater of war and to reinforce conventional units in large scale land Professor Danilenko worked with many of the greats of and sea operations.35 This would have helped Russian nuclear weapons science including Zababakhan, the Soviet Union achieve success in these Krupnikov, and Kuzlov on crucial national security issues. theaters of war and would have diverted forces Krupnikov, who helped develop the electrical contact shock of the enemy from Soviet territory. wave diagnostics for the first Russian nuclear weapon, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons worked on the conversion of shock-compressed graphite Updated January 17, 2019 Congressional Research Service into diamond. Danilenko’s knowledge of shock https://crsreports.congress.gov compaction/compression instrumentation and techniques RL32572 played a vital role in the understanding of how different materials behave under varying conditions of pressure and temperature. The recognition and developing of these complex physical states of matter are an essential parameter in the design of nuclear weapons. When Danilenko began working at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, its scientists were preoccupied with miniaturizing nuclear weapons so they could readily fit inside missiles, conventional bombs and even artillery shells. In doing so, they faced a significant technical challenge: creating a small but highly precise detonator of conventional explosives that could send a powerful shock wave through a core of plutonium or enriched uranium at the center of the device. Danilenko was key to the success in these endeavors The military annexes to the November 2011 IAEA report indicated that, “Iran has made major progress in assembling all the technology and developing the manufacturing skills and equipment necessary to design a fission warhead. The annexes indicated that Iran is closer to building a warhead small enough to mount on a missile and test it through simulated explosive testing than has previously been publically reported. IAEA reporting since that time has provided more indicators that Iran is close to being able to test a Uranium fission device once it obtains weapons grade Uranium, and key US experts indicate that Iran may have acquired more weapons design and passive test data than the IAEA has yet announced.” The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions and Options for Deterrence, Defense, Containment, and Preventive Strikes By Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold July 18, 2013page 77, csis.org/files/publication/120222_Iran_Gulf_Mil_Bal_II_WMD.pd February 20, 2019 15 ➢ UNDERSTANDING THE DEADLY CRUISE MISSILE THREAT Cruise missiles pose perhaps the gravest delivery system proliferation threat. They are inexpensive to build and can, therefore, overwhelm current defenses by sheer numbers. They can be designed to be small with low-thrust engines and can penetrate radar and infrared-detection networks. The technology to build them is simple and available to any country that builds even rudimentary aircraft.” Cruise missile technology offers the means for developing a precision strike capability much more cheaply than would be required to procure a modern air force. Once built, cruise missiles require little maintenance and fewer trained personnel to operate and deploy than does a fleet of jet aircraft. Since cruise missiles are unmanned, they require no flight crew training, which takes years for a professional pilot. There are no expensive upkeep programs and flight maintenance, and no need special Because of highly accurate guidance systems hangars nor large air bases buildings for housing as with that can place the missile within a few feet of the manned aircraft. A cruise missile airframe does not undergo intended target, the most advanced LACM can particularly severe stress on its flight to a target, it does not be used effectively against very small targets, pull any high “g” maneuvers, and it does not experience even when armed with conventional warheads. LACM guidance usually occurs in three phases: propulsion accelerations associated with gun or ballistic launch, midcourse, and terminal. During the missile launches. Virtually any airframe that is structurally launch phase, a missile is guided using only the sound enough to be used in an ordinary airplane is adequate inertial navigation system (INS). In the for a cruise missile. A designer can use factors of safety of midcourse phase, a missile is guided by the INS 1.5 or 2 in the design to ensure structural integrity under all updated by one or more of the following systems: a radar-based terrain contour matching dynamic conditions without recourse to structural finite (TERCOM) system, a radar or optical scene element computer codes, which generally only assist a matching system, and/or a satellite navigation designer to shave four or five percent from the weight of a system, such as the US Global Positioning System design. (a)FAS Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles as (GPS) or the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS). The terminal guidance phase a potential threat because they share so many common begins when a missile enters the target area and technologies with existing vehicles that have been designed uses either more accurate terrain contour data for other purposes. Much of the hardware to construct a or a terminal seeker — usually an optical or radar- cruise missile can be had by cannibalizing existing based sensor. commercial aircraft or by purchasing parts and components for the missile from legitimate suppliers. The technology tables serve only as a guideline to alert and inform export control regulators of general categories of technologies as opposed to specific performance specifications. LACM guidance usually occurs in three phases: launch, midcourse, and terminal. During the launch phase, a missile is guided using only the inertial navigation system (INS). During the midcourse phase, the missile’s INS is updated by one or more of the following systems: a satellite navigation system (such as the US Global Positioning System (GPS) or the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS)), a terrain contour matching (TERCOM) system, or a radar or optical scene matching system. The terminal guidance phase begins when a missile enters the target area and uses either a more accurate scene matching system or a terminal seeker (usually an optical or radar-based sensor). Some advanced LACM have the potential to have highly accurate guidance systems that can place the missile within a few feet February 20, 2019 16 LACM can be challenging targets for air defense of the intended target. LACM can be challenging targets for systems. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes air defense systems. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes to stay below a radar’s line of sight. to stay below a radar’s line of sight. Depending on a Depending on a country’s ability to do mission country’s ability to do mission planning, the missile can use planning, the missile can use terrain features, terrain features, such as mountains/valleys, to hide from such as mountains/valleys, to hide from radars. radars. Furthermore, LACM may fly circuitous routes to the target, avoiding radar and air defense installations. A salvo Furthermore, LACM may fly circuitous routes to the target, avoiding radar and air defense of missiles can be launched to approach a target installations. simultaneously from different directions, potentially overwhelming air defenses. Some missiles have A salvo of cruise missiles can be launched to approach a target simultaneously from different incorporated stealth features to make them less visible to directions, potentially overwhelming air radars and infrared detectors. Some developmental defenses. systems may incorporate chaff or decoys as an added layer of protection, though concealment will remain a cruise Some cruise missiles have incorporated stealth features to make them less visible to radars and missile’s main defense. infrared detectors. Some developmental systems may incorporate chaff or decoys as an added layer of protection, though concealment will remain a cruise missile’s main defense. AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES , IRAN The Iranian air force has already installed land-attack versions of the Noor cruise missile on its F-14, F-4 and Su-24 fighter jets. It’s theoretically possible the Islamic Republic could install the Soumar & Hoveyzeh on fighter jets. This would be similar the US Tomahawk cruise derivatives designed to fit on F-16s. The AGM-158 JASSM is the current iteration of these US fighter-launched cruise missiles. The Su-24 is a likely suspect. In 2018 the IRI restored an Su-24 attack aircraft after years of it being grounded at an airbase in Shiraz, located in southern region of the IRI .Iranian Air Force experts reportedly overhauled several Sukhoi Su-24 fighter jets for the first time in 2014. The Russian Su-24 (NATO reporting name: Fencer) is a supersonic, all-weather attack aircraft developed in the Soviet Union. The aircraft has a variable-sweep wing, twin-engines and a side-by-side seating arrangement for its two crew. It was the first of the USSR’s aircraft to carry an integrated digital navigation/attack system. Tehran’s F-14, Su-24 and F-4 jets could fire their missiles toward an unspecified target in a pre-defined area and do so from thousands of kilometers away. SUBMARINE LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE CAPABILITY Iranian Fateh Class Diesel-Electric Submarine On 17 February 2019 Iranian President Hassan Rouhani unveiled a “state-of-the-art” version of the Fateh submarine, which the defense ministry said is capable of firing cruise missiles. Mehr news reported that the 600-tonne submarine launched on Sunday February 20, 2019 17 is equipped with torpedoes and naval mines, and can operate more than 200m below sea level for up to five weeks. Tasnim news agency added that the Fateh is also outfitted with a guided-missile system capable of launching submarine-launched cruise missiles and an advanced sonic radar system that can identify enemy vessels. “The Fateh is entirely a homegrown submarine that is designed and developed by experts of the defense ministry and is equipped with the world’s modern technologies,” Brigadier General Amir Hatami, the defense minister, was quoted by Tasnim on Saturday as saying. Video – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5ZPYI6zkMk The Fateh class submarine has a displacement of 527-ton when surfaced and 600-ton when submerged. This submarine has an operational diving depth is 200 meters while its maximum diving depth is 250 meters. The Fateh submarine has range of over 5000 kilometers when snorting at slow speed. The Fateh submarine has a top speed of 11 knots (20 km/h) when surfaced and 14 knots (26 km/h) when the submarine is submerged. Submarine has sea endurance of over 35 days. SUMMARY The Islamic Republic of Iran currently possesses the largest ballistic and cruise missile inventory in the Middle East, and the country’s military research & development and scientific establishments are working to increase the sophistication, scale, and reach of its missiles. Missiles form a key pillar in the Islamic Republic’s Mosaic Warfare security and defense strategy, enabling the Tehran to have a credible deterrent against perceived foreign aggression. Hence Tehran’s unfolding Mosaic Warfare requires the IRI to spread a missile network throughout its desired Shiite Crescent. February 20, 2019 18 Middle East FAQs Volume 1: What is the Shia Crescent? January 17, 2018 Video Link https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/middle-east-faqs-volume-1-what- is-the-shia-crescent As seen today the IRI is arming its militant proxy forces within this Shiite Crescent with various missile capabilities and even missile production. Its Hezbollah military wing current poses over has over 100,000 rockets and missiles and can fire over 1,000 per day, targeting almost every major city in Israel. Hezbollah also manufactures weapons in Lebanon, producing drones and guided missiles, amongst other systems. In the past, Hezbollah rockets had crude guidance systems and mostly landed on Israeli fields or other unpopulated parts of the country. ▪ Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with a large and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, antiair, antitank, and anti-ship cruise missiles. The evolving and robust missile force also permits the IRI the ability to coerce and intimidate regional adversaries, as well as continue its involvement in low-intensity conflict throughout the Middle East without fearing direct kinetic reprisal. Cruise missiles also offer Iran the capability to offset the evolving ballistic missile defense capabilities of its adversaries. Cruise missiles hug the terrain they fly over, are smaller, and require less infrastructure to support than ballistic missiles. The Islamic Republic longer-range missile capabilities is critical to compensate for its shortcomings in conventional forces. Given the emphasis Iran places on its cruise missile programs, it is clear that Tehran considers its cruise missile arsenal among its most important asset as both a deterrent to attackers and leverage over other regional players. Stealth Technology: We are also seeing stealth technology being incorporated into cruise missiles. As early as 2004 the Iranian Defense Ministry announced that Iran had produced the Kosar, an indigenous and allegedly stealthy ASCM. Mosaic Asymmetric Warfare Doctrine. Evolving pre-emptied strike capabilities as well as a means to strike at high-value targets with little warning, such as population centers and Western and Western- backed forces in the region, including US bases in the Persian Gulf. February 20, 2019 19 ➢ Arguably the cruise missile threat has grown uncontrollably, with the high cost of missile defense interceptors makes such defenses increasingly unaffordable and ultimately ineffective in coping with combined ballistic and cruise missile attacks. The spread cruise missiles and especially of land-attack cruise missiles are driven by harsh military realities: inexpensive, the quantum leap in dual-use technologies supporting cruise missile development (including satellite navigation and guidance, high-resolution satellite imagery from commercial vendors, unregulated flight management systems for converting aircraft into UAVs and digital mapping technologies for mission planning). The emergence of the cruise missile threat even confronts the American military forces with enormous challenges. The effectiveness of both airborne and ground-based surveillance radars are undermined by missile designs that are increasingly sleek and aerodynamic and have lower radar cross-sections. Reduced radar detection means that the defense has less time to react. Also, many cruise missiles have very low flight profiles and employ terrain features to avoid detection. Low flight impedes airborne surveillance, owing to radar “clutter” from ground objects other than the target, which makes cruise missile a land launched cruise missile difficult to detect. The 1991 Gulf War saw the cruise missile deadly capabilities play upon the world stage as American Tomahawk cruise missiles devastated Saddam’s Iraq. However, it was not until the 2003 US-Iraq war that the Islamic Republic of Iran along with other major countries grasped the cruise missile military depth. Every Scud missile that Saddam Hussein fired at American forces shot down as expected. However, what astonished the international community every cruise missile launched by Saddam (five) not one was shot down. At least two Iraqi ultralight aircraft which were feared capable of carrying chemical or biological agents were detected only after flying over thousands of U.S. troops, equipment, and command facilities before a U.S. Army division’s advance on Baghdad. The lessons learned in the 2003 Gulf War took effect in the war’s aftermath. The five crude Iraqi cruise missiles that evaded detection or destruction caused only limited fratricide damage, friendly aircraft was shot down. Defense Specialists within the U.S. government and elsewhere noted the chief lesson became that ballistic missile defenses alone cannot address the threat of low-flying cruise missiles. Just after the formal combat of the 2003 Iraq war ended senior U.S. military officials voiced their concern about the implications of Iraq’s minimal cruise missile attacks. “This was a glimpse of future threats. It is a poor man’s air force,” the chief of staff of the 32nd U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command told the New York Times. “A thinking enemy will use uncommon means such as cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles on multiple fronts.” February 20, 2019 20 In summary, LACM capability provides Tehran new ways to reach targets, making the regime’s missile force more stratified and thus more lethal. US, European, Gulf, and Israeli policymakers and experts agree that Iran possesses a large and growing missile forces, with a growing number of missiles capable of hitting Israel, US Forces in the region and Europe. Association of Geo-Strategic Analysis February 20, 2019 21