Iran expert at INSS and at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Raz Zimmt, told the Post that anyone who says that “the regime fully controls the results – this is not true.”
YONAH JEREMY BOB JULY 7, 2024 20:08
Updated: JULY 7, 2024 20:20
IRAN’S SUPREME Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the death of the leader of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, at Khomeini’s shrine in Tehran, last week.(photo credit: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA via REUTERS)Following the surprise win of reformist Masoud Pezeshkian in Iran’s presidential election this weekend, the Jerusalem Post interviewed multiple experts about what the change means for Tehran, Israel, and the world.
Iran expert at INSS and at the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Raz Zimmt, told the Post that anyone who says that “the regime fully controls the results – this is not true.”
“The Iranian regime completes its intervention at the stage of selecting which candidates get passed the Guardian Council. Once the Guardian Council has approved or disqualified candidates – which is its blatant intervention, then maybe the Basij [Iranian regime militia] can do propaganda, but their intervention is limited. It is a country of over 90 million people. They cannot influence more unless they forge the results themselves,” he added.
He noted that in 2009, Iran is believed to have forged the election results to give a victory to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but this was in a situation where the opposition was viewed as truly anti-regime.
In contrast, Pezeshkian, even with a “reformist” label, is viewed as fundamentally loyal to the regime.
According to Zimmt, the biggest open question in this run-off election was voter turnout. Provided that voter turnout would be higher than in the first round – and it dropped from around 40% turnout to around 50% turnout – the chances of Pezeshkian winning grew significantly.
Zimmit explained that the broader population is always more moderate than the regime.
Clearly from Pezeshkian jumping from over 10 million votes to over 16 million votes in the run-off, he won the majority of the new voters, said Zimmt.
According to Zimmt, many of the voters for the other candidates who failed to make the run-off ended up voting for Pezeshkian even though those other candidates themselves endorsed hardliner Saeed Jalili.
He explained that the other candidates, while generally discussed in the media as hardliners, were still more pragmatic than Jalili, such that many of their supporters ignored the endorsements, and voted for Pezeshkian as closer to their pragmatist stance.
Why did Khamenei enable the ‘reformist’ to win?
An additional question which has arisen is if Khamenei could control who ran for president (even if he could not control completely who wins once the list of candidates is set), why didn’t he make sure that whoever was the reformist candidate running would be a no-name loser?
Zimmt said that he does not buy into “conspiracies, rather, Khamenei wanted one of the hardliners to win and that Pezeshkian was not expected to present a threat – and Pezeshkian’s win caught Khamenei off-guard.
In addition, the Iran expert said that “some say Khamenei wanted Pezeshkian because he was worried Trump will win” the US presidential election and wanted to quickly “present a nicer face to the West” to try to cut a nuclear deal before Trump enters office.
However, Zimmt pointed out that almost all of these explanations are after-the-fact of the election results and were not necessarily what was being said before.
He said he does not accept these explanations, and asks “if Khamenei wanted [a reformist like] Pezeshkian to win, he could have done it much more simply. He could approve someone with a better chance like former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani.”
Further, he noted that “Khamenei can deal with all of them. Pezeshkian will still be a weak president so he can control him and he will remain loyal to the regime.”
Another key issue is whether Pezeshkian can shift Iran policy enough to bring the Islamic Republic back into a nuclear deal which would restore limits on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief which have hobbled its economy.
Responding, Zimmt stated, “Pezeshkian can say whatever he wants. I don’t see any chance that Khamenei goes back, not into the JCPOA, not a stronger and longer deal, and not a shorter and weaker deal.”
Khamenei “could have struck a compromise in the term of Rouhani or in summer 2022,” but chose not to.
Moreover, Zimmt said that no Iran analysts think that Khamenei would turn the clock back to enriching uranium only to 3.5% or even down to the mid-level enrichment of 20%,.
Rather, at best he said Khamenei might restore an understanding in summer 2023 of freezing new high-level 60% uranium enrichment.
According to Zimmt, Khamenei simply has no incentive to make major concessions “when Trump could change any deal – so why agree to anything?”
“Khamenei will wait for the November election in the US” before deciding what direction to go in with the nuclear program.
Still, Zimmt acknowledged that it would be easier to at least restart nuclear negotiations with a Pezeshkian government, including with former foreign minister Javad Zarif as an adviser and possibly even returning to his old role.
Zimmt was questioned about whether Pezeshkian is a true reformist like former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), who was willing to go much farther in trying to emulate the West and reforming Iran to become more fundamentally democratic versus former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), who was called a pragmatist since he only tried to make more minor reforms to the regime and character of Iran. Even Rouhani did care more about marketing Iran to the West than the hardliners, who believe in constant brinkmanship with the West.
Zimmt said he was somewhere in between the two: seeking more reform than Rouhani, but not quite as ambitious as Khatami.
Examples of reforms Pezeshkian will try to push for besides a return to the Iran nuclear deal and the lifting of sanctions include being more open to: civil society, civil rights, women’s issues, and ethnic minorities – especially since he is from a western part of Iran that has more minorities.
However, Zimmt said even on these issues his influence would be limited. He would not be able to eliminate the law requiring wearing a Hijab head covering for women.
Rather, Zimmt said he might succeed in reducing enforcement or limiting allocating funds for enforcement and punishments relating to the Hijab.
A major change which Zimmt said Pezeshkian might pull off would be to make one of his vice presidents a woman.
He said Pezeshkian could do this without parliamentary approval, unlike certain other government posts.
Pezeshkian is not considered a heavyweight like Raisi who might replace Khamenei himself, when the Supreme Leader dies.
Rather, Zimmt said that the leading potential replacements would be Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, who is in his mid-50s, or senior members of the top Iranian councils which already run much of Iran.
The Ayatollah’s son is highly ambitious, aggressive, close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and a force to be reckoned with.
But he would need to get over the huge obstacles that both the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini, rejected the idea of family dynasties as un-Islamic, and that Khamenei himself has attacked this idea at times.
Alternatives who Zimmt named included: Alireza Arafi and Mohsen Qomi, who are not well-known globally, but within Iran they serve on the country’s top body for selecting the supreme leader, known as the Assembly of Experts.
Both have strong religious credentials and would continue the role of the clergy atop the country’s pyramid of power.
Arafi is also a member of the Guardian Council, which decides who can run for all other national offices, and was formerly in charge of the country’s universities.
Qomi has been the number one or two officials of multiple special offices close to Khamenei, and is also an expert in international relations.
Iran expert Dr. Meir Javedanfar of Reichman University said that, “Pezeshkian is an establishment figure. Despite being a reformist, he has close relations with the Deep State (aka, the Regime). I believe that Khamenei allowed him to run because he realized that Iran needs to carry out domestic reforms, especially in the economy. To do that Khamenei needs people who, comparatively speaking, have more legitimacy; this makes the Reformists ideal.”
Next, Javedanfar stated, “I believe that Pezeshkian’s victory significantly increases the chances of a more limited nuclear deal between Iran and the US. The regime in Iran is terrified of Trump. Reaching a deal with him would be far more difficult because he killed [IRGC Quds Force Chief] Qasem Soleymani.”
In addition, he said, “Iran’s economy needs its frozen funds abroad. Therefore, reaching a limited deal with Biden before the US elections is an opportunity that I believe the Iranians will take.”
Further, he said, “Khamenei will not give up on Iran’s relations with Russia and China. Yet, he also realizes that Iran’s economy is the Achilles Heel of the regime. This is why I don’t believe he will oppose a limited nuclear deal, and efforts to improve relations with the EU.”
Content retrieved from: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-809296.