Iran’s nuclear negotiators have been granted permission to enter direct talks with the United States, multiple informed senior sources have told Amwaj.media. The apparent U-turn by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei could be a watershed moment for the contention over the Iranian nuclear program.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, senior Iranian sources said top nuclear negotiator Ali Baqeri-Kani is ready to meet with White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk in Oman as early as the coming weeks. If the sought session materializes, the sources charged, the next step would be for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Britain, France, China, Russia, and the US) and Germany to convene a meeting with Iran. One source speculated that if the latter gathering takes place, it could follow ‘Transition Day’ under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely Oct. 18. However, some experts have painted a far less ambitious picture, highlighting the need for a sober understanding of the substantial time commitment and complexities involved in reaching a deal.
Differing game plans
Informed Iranian sources indicated that Tehran’s aim is to return to the table where things stood in the autumn of 2022, when indirect Iran-US talks over the preceding year ended in a deadlock. However, this ignores how moods in western capitals have changed in the aftermath of Iran’s deadly crackdown on anti-establishment protests last year.
The Islamic Republic’s arms transfers to Russia have further complicated the situation. To Europe, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a fundamental security threat. Iran, on the other hand, has leveraged the conflict to elevate relations with Moscow to an unprecedented level, particularly in the military sphere. These dynamics have made Iran’s deliveries of armed drones to Russia a top item on the European political agenda. It has also heavily reduced interest among the E3 (Britain, France, and Germany) to engage with Iran in a multilateral setting where Russia is also present.
As for the JCPOA itself, Washington has made clear that it does not view a clean revival of the accord as a viable option. The Joe Biden administration insists on alterations, including an extension of expiring restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities. At the same time, observers in the know privately told Amwaj.media, even if there is an understanding on a restoration of the JCPOA with modifications only subsequently implemented, the White House is not likely to strike such a bargain prior to the 2024 US presidential elections.
This is while Iran has since the Donald Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 insisted that the original bargain cannot be altered. Tehran has also strongly reacted against the toughening European stance, including Europe’s refusal to lift sanctions slated to be terminated on ‘Transition Day’ under the JCPOA.
The differing interpretations of what is and is not possible raise major questions about what direct Iran-US engagement can realistically achieve. On the other hand, ending the post-2018 taboo on bilateral nuclear talks could open the door to solutions that have so far not been considered.
Khamenei’s U-turn on direct engagement
In the aftermath of his unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, then-US president Trump (2017-21) on repeated occasions sought to negotiate a new nuclear deal. Iran’s chief negotiator at the time, foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (2013-21), was in 2019 invited to the White House for direct talks to hammer out an accord. However, Khamenei flat out rejected direct talks unless Trump reversed his exit from the JCPOA. Those dynamics meant that Tehran and Washington entered an escalatory cycle that came to eventually result in the Jan. 2020 US assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad and the subsequent Iranian bombardment of US bases in Iraq.
When President Biden entered office in Jan. 2021, there were hopes in Iran that he would promptly act on his campaign pledge to undo Trump’s exit from the JCPOA. Seemingly gearing to ensure such an outcome, Iran’s conservative-dominated parliament in Dec. 2020 adopted a law which obliged the Iranian government to abandon JCPOA restrictions on nuclear activities unless Biden re-entered the deal within 30 days of becoming president. The absence of a clean restoration of the nuclear deal ultimately helped produce a renewed escalatory cycle, with overt direct engagement remaining a taboo.
However, calculations appear to have changed in 2023. The Iranian political leadership earlier this year gave the green light for ‘Track II’ talks with US figures to begin. Multiple sessions have been held in northern Europe, Amwaj.media has learned, providing a platform for the exchange of ideas among well-connected former officials, think tankers and academics from both sides. Meanwhile, informed sources explained, Iranian and US officials have on repeated occasions met to discuss an array of issues.
These measures have helped produce an informal understanding to “de-escalate” tensions. Iranian steps have included a slowing down in the accumulation of highly-enriched uranium, upping cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and avoiding provocations in the region. On the US side, sanctions enforcement has been less stringent while Iran has been permitted to access assets frozen in third countries.
It is in this context, with practical US measures resulting in tangible dividends, that Khamenei has granted Baqeri-Kani sweeping powers to negotiate directly with the United States, informed Iranian sources told Amwaj.media.
While Iran wishes to activate the so-called ‘Muscat process’, it is important to note that Baqeri-Kani had permission to engage with McGurk on the sidelines of the recent UN General Assembly. However, a series of developments appear to have shifted engagement to Oman. On the one hand, one well-informed observer told Amwaj.media, the US was closely watching Baqeri-Kani’s Sept. 19 meeting with E3 representatives in New York. The session was unproductive, another source said, describing the top Iranian nuclear negotiator as strongly reacting against European conditions such as Iran’s release of European detainees and ending arms deliveries to Russia.
On the other hand, the Biden administration’s refusal to permit Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to visit the Iranian Interests Section at the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington DC appears to have further dampened the mood. Some Iranian sources portrayed the US snub as a lost opportunity for a confidence-building measure. Others noted to Amwaj.media that appearing tough on Iran—particularly amid the domestic backlash over the recent prisoner exchange and unfreezing of Iranian assets in South Korea—would help Biden gain political space for direct engagement outside the United States.
Possible trajectories
Looking ahead, Iranian sources told Amwaj.media that Tehran initially wants the current “de-escalatory” track to continue. Confidence-building measures by Iran are set to include cooperation with the IAEA, mindful of the reported barring of British, French, and German inspectors over the E3’s refusal to lift missile sanctions next month under the JCPOA. To reiterate, the ultimate Iranian objective is to restart talks on the JCPOA based on where things stood in the autumn of 2022.
The US appears to want a “no deal, no tension” scenario, at least through the 2024 presidential elections. Whether the White House can offer sufficient incentives and pursue a diplomatic process with Iran that sets things up for the implementation of understandings if Biden is re-elected is difficult to gauge. What is apparent, however, is that a restoration of the JCPOA over the next year will be difficult—if not impossible. Mindful of the added difficulties presented by the E3’s reticence to engage with Russia even in a multilateral setting, Iran and the US may need to think outside the box.
Indeed, as some informed observers highlighted to Amwaj.media, whether Iran and the US engage in a bilateral or multilateral format, the core contention has always been between Tehran and Washington. In other words, if there is going to be a diplomatic process, it must be an Iran-US process. While the Biden administration has sought direct engagement with the Islamic Republic, it has indicated less interest in engaging in the ‘Muscat process’. The logistical aspects of the dialogue must be settled soon, with possible consideration of other interlocutors who have offered their services.
Most importantly, it could very well be that the interests of Iran and the US—and indeed the P5+1 as a whole—are best served by repeating the precedent provided by some of the experiences associated with the JCPOA. The negotiations leading up to the 2015 accord were notably preceded by Iran-US talks in places like Muscat. If such a template is to be pursued, the P5+1 would in effect rubber stamp whatever understanding American and Iranian negotiators may reach. In a climate where a P5+1-Iran meeting will likely entail far more contentions than that between Iran and the US, perhaps such a setting is best avoided in the near future.
Content retrieved from: https://amwaj.media/article/scoop-khamenei-grants-permission-for-direct-iran-us-nuclear-talks.
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