Developments suggest that Turkey is gradually acquiring the ability to project naval power across two strategically important maritime theaters: the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Israel must plan its next steps. Opinion.
Jonathan Pollard
Published: Aug 21, 2026, 11:15 AM (GMT+3)
Jonathan PollardArutz Sheva
Tensions between Turkey and Greece are once again rising over conflicting maritime claims. Just recently, Ankara officially designated two “protected zones” in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean that, according to Greek sources, infringe upon Greek maritime rights. One is located in the northern Aegean, between the Greek islands of Limnos and Samothraki, while the other is in the Eastern Mediterranean, separating Kastellorizo from Rhodes. Greek sources argue that these Turkish claims, which are ostensibly based on environmental concerns, are completely unjustified, pointing out that no significant environmental problems have been reported in either area to date.
These Turkish claims are part of the broader Mavi Vatan, or “Blue Homeland,” doctrine-a concept intended to assert Turkish maritime jurisdiction over approximately 462,000 square kilometers of surrounding seas. The doctrine encompasses portions of the Black Sea, Aegean Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean.
The concept was developed in the mid-2000s by Turkish naval officers, most notably Admiral Cem Gürdeniz and Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı. Blue Homeland seeks to secure Turkish access to offshore energy exploration, drilling rights, fishing grounds, and other maritime resources that overlap with areas claimed by Greece and Cyprus. It also complicates competing regional infrastructure projects, including subsea electricity interconnectors linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, as well as various proposed energy pipelines.
More disturbing, however, was the 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime delimitation agreement, which dramatically expanded Turkey’s asserted maritime claims into the Central Mediterranean. Although the agreement was strongly opposed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, Turkey has shown little willingness to withdraw its claims. Indeed, Ankara has reinforced its position by raising the possibility of establishing a naval presence in Tripoli in order to uphold what it regards as its maritime “rights” under the agreement signed with Libya’s internationally recognized government at the time.
This expansionist campaign under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is further supported by the Turkish Navy’s ambitious shipbuilding program. The program includes numerous new warships, including frigates, corvettes, amphibious vessels, submarines, and other platforms intended to extend Turkey’s naval reach. Turkey has also expressed increasingly ambitious plans for the future development of its naval aviation and submarine capabilities.
Turkey has repeatedly used its naval forces to pressure and intimidate Greek vessels in the Aegean. More recently, there have also been reports of growing friction between Turkish and Israeli naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Given the increasingly confrontational political environment, even a relatively minor maritime incident could potentially escalate into a much more serious confrontation between Israel and Turkey. For that reason alone, the behavior of Turkish naval commanders deserves close scrutiny.
Turkish vessel (right) in an exerciseU.S. Navy
Even more troubling is Turkey’s growing military presence beyond the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara has deployed naval forces to Somalia and has sought to expand its military infrastructure in the Red Sea region. Taken together, these developments suggest that Turkey is gradually acquiring the ability to project naval power across two strategically important maritime theaters: the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear how Israel should best respond to this emerging challenge.
At present, Israel’s surface fleet is principally designed to defend the country’s offshore gas infrastructure and maintain maritime security in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new Reshef-class corvettes are capable ships, but Israel’s relatively small surface fleet would face serious challenges in a prolonged confrontation with a much larger Turkish Navy supported by land-based aircraft and missile systems.
Israel does, of course, possess an exceptionally capable submarine force. Our fighter aircraft also have the range and capabilities necessary to support naval operations under the right circumstances. Nevertheless, the availability of sustained air support cannot simply be assumed. Israeli airfields could themselves come under attack, while the Air Force might simultaneously be required to conduct intensive operations elsewhere.
Israel’s submarines also have important strategic missions of their own. In any major confrontation, they would face a Turkish Navy that is extensively trained in NATO naval doctrine, including anti-submarine warfare. Given the limited number of Israeli submarines, I believe it would be extremely dangerous to commit them unnecessarily to missions in which the potential losses could be catastrophic. Their strategic value means that they must be employed with considerable caution.
Israeli navy Dolphin-class submarineFlash 90
So far, therefore, the picture does not look particularly encouraging. Nevertheless, Israel does possess several potential ways of evening the odds. The key, in my view, is the intelligent use of what I call “force multipliers.”
Borrowing from the broader principles of modern anti-access/area-denial strategies, Israel could place greater emphasis on long-range precision weapons, unmanned systems, advanced intelligence, and other capabilities that would allow a relatively small military to impose disproportionate costs on a much larger adversary.
The central advantage of such systems is that they could complicate an opposing navy’s ability to operate freely over large distances. A combination of long-range precision weapons, unmanned platforms, electronic warfare, decoys, and sophisticated intelligence could potentially overwhelm or disrupt an adversary’s defensive architecture without requiring Israel to match Turkey ship-for-ship.
Extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles could also become an important component of such a strategy. These systems could give Israel an additional means of monitoring maritime activity and complicating the operations of an adversary while reducing the risks associated with committing scarce manned platforms.
Unmanned aircraft could provide another important layer. High-endurance unmanned systems equipped with advanced sensors and precision weapons could extend Israel’s ability to monitor and influence distant maritime areas without placing pilots at unnecessary risk.
If coordinated properly, such a multi-domain strategy could give Israel a far greater ability to deter or disrupt hostile naval operations than the size of our surface fleet alone would suggest. The objective should not be to build a navy capable of matching Turkey vessel for vessel. Rather, it should be to ensure that any attempt to threaten Israel’s maritime trade or infrastructure would carry unacceptable costs.
The same principle applies to Turkey’s naval bases and infrastructure. If Israel develops sufficiently capable intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and long-range strike capabilities, Turkey would have to take into account the vulnerability of its naval infrastructure as well as its ships at sea.
Of course, if accurate intelligence were ever obtained indicating that Turkey intended to establish a blockade against Israel, the government would face an extremely difficult strategic decision. Any Israeli response would have to be based on clear intelligence, international law, the broader strategic consequences, and-above all-the prevention of unnecessary escalation.
So far, so good. But when considering the possible adoption of these force multipliers, we must also consider cost and whether there are more effective alternatives that might be less expensive.
In this particular case, I have yet to see a convincing alternative to building a much larger Israeli arsenal of long-range precision systems, unmanned platforms, and other technologies capable of extending our reach without requiring a massive expansion of the manned military.
There is also the question of manufacturing costs. New production techniques for missiles, unmanned aircraft, submarines, and other advanced systems have increasingly streamlined manufacturing, making it possible to produce sophisticated equipment at greater scale. If several branches of the military can utilize common platforms and technologies, economies of scale become possible.
If there are so many obvious advantages to these systems, then why aren’t we building them?
A large part of the problem involves institutions and organizations that have a vested interest in maintaining legacy systems. In Israel’s case, one of the central issues has traditionally been the dominant role of the Air Force in long-range strike planning.
What this approach sometimes fails to recognize is that a substantial precision-missile capability could actually make the Air Force more effective rather than less important.
First, a missile force would provide Israel with a rapid-reaction capability that manned aircraft simply cannot always match.
Second, precision missile strikes could potentially suppress or disrupt dense enemy air-defense networks, making subsequent operations by manned aircraft safer and more effective.
Third, a robust missile force could strike distant targets without requiring the extensive aerial-refueling infrastructure needed by manned aircraft operating at very long ranges.
Fourth, enemy naval forces with limited defensive magazines could be placed under considerable pressure by large-scale, sophisticated attacks involving multiple types of precision systems and unmanned platforms.
Finally, a large missile establishment would allow the IDF to engage a substantially greater number of targets without relying exclusively on manned aircraft.
All in all, the existence of a large and sophisticated long-range precision-strike force would provide the IDF with a broad range of advantages. Perhaps most importantly, many of these systems could be produced domestically, thereby enhancing Israel’s military self-sufficiency.
The strategic environment around Israel is changing rapidly. Turkey is developing a more ambitious maritime doctrine, expanding its naval capabilities, and extending its military presence into areas of direct strategic importance to Israel.
Israel therefore cannot afford to assume that the maritime balance of power will remain unchanged.
I can only hope that the next government will instruct the Ministry of Defense to seriously examine the creation of a much larger, domestically supported long-range precision-strike capability. The objective should not be to seek war with Turkey-or anyone else-but to ensure that Israel possesses the means to deter aggression and protect its vital interests if deterrence fails.
We simply cannot afford to waste time arguing about whether the strategic environment is changing. It already is.
About The Author
