Turkey’s rise Is America’s loss: Saving the Eastern Med Alliance

Amine Ayoub – is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco.

For a brief moment, the Eastern Mediterranean seemed to offer a blueprint for American-led stability: a strategic alliance between Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States — the “3+1” — aimed at securing democracy, energy resources, and maritime freedom in one of the world’s most contested regions.

Today, that fragile alliance is faltering, and America’s adversaries are racing to fill the vacuum.

The 3+1 was never simply about natural gas. It was about protecting critical sea lanes, promoting regional prosperity among democracies, and ensuring the Eastern Mediterranean did not fall prey to authoritarian expansion. It was a platform to counterbalance Russia’s naval surge, Iran’s creeping influence, and Turkey’s aggressive ambitions.

Yet, slowly and dangerously, that vision is unraveling.

Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has abandoned any illusion of being a constructive NATO partner. His regime has pivoted toward open hostility, not just against regional neighbors, but against the very principles underpinning Western security. Ankara’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine — envisioning Turkish naval supremacy from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean is not a diplomatic slogan. It is a militarized campaign of intimidation.

Turkey has deployed warships to challenge Cyprus’s right to drill in its own Exclusive Economic Zone. It has escalated aerial violations over Greek islands, often conducting armed overflights that would be considered acts of war if carried out elsewhere. In Libya, Ankara has sent arms, mercenaries, and drones to manipulate political outcomes. Its military presence in Northern Syria destabilized U.S.-backed local forces.

And at home, Erdogan has crushed dissent, rigged elections, and fueled an aggressive ultranationalism that frames NATO and the United States as obstacles to Turkish destiny.

Meanwhile, Erdogan’s deepening ties with Russia and Iran are no accident. Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system — over strong American objections — was a clear statement: Ankara will no longer subordinate its ambitions to NATO’s strategic needs. From co-producing drones with Iran to energy deals with Moscow, Erdogan’s Turkey is acting as a spoiler, not an ally.

The Eastern Mediterranean is not a niche theater. It is a strategic crossroads linking Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Half the world’s seaborne trade passes through nearby chokepoints. Whoever controls this region exerts disproportionate influence over global commerce, energy flows, and security architectures.

Failing to defend the Eastern Mediterranean would fracture NATO’s southeastern flank, empower authoritarian predators, and force Europe into greater dependency on adversarial energy and security arrangements.

Greece and Cyprus, facing constant Turkish pressure, have pursued their own hedging strategies, seeking rapprochement to avoid conflict. Israel, preoccupied with its internal security challenges, has retreated from ambitious Eastern Mediterranean initiatives like the EastMed pipeline. And American leadership — once the engine of the 3+1 — has allowed the alliance to wither into little more than occasional diplomatic summits.

Russia has entrenched its naval presence in Libya, expanding its Mediterranean fleet and directly challenging NATO operations. Iran, emboldened by Western hesitation, has deepened its influence among Arab militias across the Levant and begun projecting that power westward. China, too, is buying strategic ports and investing heavily in Eastern Mediterranean infrastructure under its Belt and Road Initiative.

There is still time to reforge the 3+1 into a stronger, more resilient structure , but it demands urgency and realism about the threats at hand.

First, the United States must return visibly and forcefully to the region. That means expanding naval deployments, increasing joint military exercises with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, and finalizing defense agreements that give America a more permanent footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Second, Washington must stop indulging fantasies about Turkey “coming back to the table.” Erdogan’s government has made its choice. A transactional relationship may be necessary, but no serious strategy can proceed on the assumption that Turkey is a partner in securing regional peace.

Sanctions against Turkish violations of international law — particularly maritime aggression against Cyprus and Greece — must be on the table. U.S. recognition of Cyprus’ full maritime rights would be a powerful diplomatic statement. Military support for Athens and Nicosia should be expanded, including advanced systems that strengthen their deterrent capabilities.

Third, the economic and energy dimensions of the 3+1 must be revived. American investment in regional energy projects like the EastMed pipeline or Greek LNG terminals would not just enhance Europe’s energy security — it would also cement American influence where others seek to displace it.

Finally, and most crucially, U.S. policymakers must articulate a clear vision: that defending allies, sea lanes, and international law in the Eastern Mediterranean is defending America’s own national interest.

The lesson of the past decade is clear: Power vacuums do not stay empty. Either the United States leads in the Eastern Mediterranean or it will watch Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China carve it up.