Will Yoav Gallant’s second coming herald an Israel attack on Iran? – analysis

That Likud MK Yoav Gallant will be the next defense minister is not really news, being that it was first leaked weeks ago.

But what could be news is whether Gallant entering the defense minister’s chair with a set of 12-year-old demons to exercise could finally lead to the climactic war with Iran that many have predicted now for a long time.

What demons of the past might Gallant be contending with and why might the decision of incoming prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to appoint him as the new defense minister usher in an era of escalation against the Islamic Republic?

For that answer, we need to turn back the clock to August 6, 2010.

Israel 2010: Yoav Gallant and the debated attack on Iran’s nuclear program

Surrounding that time period, there was a debate of titans that would determine the course of Israeli history for the next decade.

On one side were then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-defense minister Ehud Barak who said they wanted to order a massive preemptive aerial strike against Tehran’s nuclear program to prevent it from crossing certain lines.

On the other side were then IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi, Mossad chief Meir Dagan and Shin Bet (Israel Seucirty Agency) chief Yuval Diskin – all of who opposed any attack on Iran prior to the point where the nuclear “sword” was at Israel’s throat. Put differently, they viewed Netanyahu and Barak as hysterically alarmist and jumping the gun, when there were other options, like covert sabotage, to avoid a general war.

Netanyahu and Barak backed off but then settled on trying again once they had a new IDF chief of their choosing (Ashkenazi was appointed by former prime minister Ehud Olmert) who would take on their more aggressive approach to the Islamic Republic.

That man was Gallant.

But the perfect Netanyahu-Barak plan was derailed when Gallant was essentially disqualified as unworthy by state gatekeeper officials.

On August 6, 2010, the “Harpaz Document,” originally and briefly known as the Gallant Document, was leaked by Col. (res.) Gabi Siboni to Channel 2.

It described a plot to improperly advance then-Maj.-Gen. Yoav Gallant toward becoming the next IDF chief of staff and undermining the office and power of Ashkenazi.

When the media first published it, Gallant was in the senior running for IDF chief of staff.

It was even briefly thought that the document was a strategy document by Barak and his aids, who favored Gallant, or by Gallant, to help him become IDF chief of staff.

Very briefly at the start, the narrative was that whoever leaked the document did so to prevent Barak or Gallant from allegedly inappropriately influencing the process.

Within a short time, however, police decided that the document was a forgery.

In a turn fit for the most far-fetched conspiracy movies, police concluded it had been drafted and leaked to inappropriately frame Gallant for actions he had not taken.

Investigators’ theory, which the state comptroller and prosecution later confirmed, was that someone, eventually found to be Ashkenazi ally Lt.-Col. Boaz Harpaz, opposed Gallant being appointed IDF chief of staff and leaked the document in order to thwart his candidacy by dragging him into a made-up scandal.

Gallant was eventually cleared of any wrongdoing, but the scandal led to a much deeper dig into his past and found that he had abused his military power to advance certain personal real estate interests.

His candidacy evaporated and he was considered damaged goods for years – with his new defense minister appointment being his first significant role since.

Netanyahu and Barak gave in to the existing security establishment’s conventional wisdom and called off the attack, trusting Israel’s fate to a mix of covert sabotage and sanctions diplomacy.

For better or for worse this meant that there has been no war with the ayatollahs for another 12 years, but it has also meant that Iran was eventually able to cross the lines that Netanyahu and Barak (and probably Gallant) had wanted to block them from crossing.

In the IDF, Gallant was known as a top and fearless general, but also as willing to take great risks, whether in Gaza or Iran, as well as being less concerned about civilian casualties and diplomatic fallout.

So is Netanyahu putting him in the Defense Ministry because he does not consider him a potential rival and giving him a key high-profile role avoids helping such a rival?

Or has Netanyahu finally got the man he wanted running the defense establishment who can give him cover to strike Iran as he said he wanted to over a decade ago? Might Gallant also go rogue and order some of his own attacks, as some Israeli defense ministers have done in the past?

It is well-known that a major reason that the US invaded Iraq in 2003 was that a similar cohort of officials had wanted to take down Saddam Hussein in 1991, and decided that their next chance in office they would finish the job.

Might this be Netanyahu and Gallant’s chance to redo their missed opportunity to attack from 2010?